A (k, n) threshold secret image sharing scheme, abbreviated as (k, n)-TSISS, splits a secret image into n shadow images in such a way that any k shadow images can be used to reconstruct the secret image is by adopting all coefficients of a (k − 1)-degree polynomial to embed the secret pixels. This benefit of small shadow size has drawn many researcher's attention and their technique has been extensively used in the following studies. In this paper, we first show that this technique is neither information theoretic secure nor computational secure. Furthermore, we point out the security defect of previous (k, n)-TSISSs for sharing textual images, and then fix up this security defect by adding an AES encryption process. At last, we prove that this new (k, n)-TSISS is computational secure.
Introduction
Secret image sharing has drawn considerable attention in recent years [3, 6, 14, 16, [20] [21] [22] [23] [29] [30] [31] . A (k, n) threshold secret image sharing scheme, abbreviated as (k, n)-TSISS, encrypts a secret image into n shadow images (also referred to be shadows) in such a way that any k shadows can be used to reconstruct the secret image exactly, but any less than k shadows should provide no information about the secret image. The secret pixel can be hidden in the constant term of a (k − 1)-degree polynomial using Shamir's (k, n) secret sharing scheme, abbreviated as Shamir's (k, n)-SSS [19] , and the secret image can be perfectly reconstructed from any k shadows by Lagrange's interpolation. In such a case, each shadow is the same size as the secret image. For example, to encrypt a 10GB satellite image by a (5, 10)-TSISS, we get 10 shadows, each with size 10GB; and to reconstruct the 10GB satellite image, we have to collect 5 shadows, which sum up to 50GB. The larger the amount of information grows, the severer the above problem suffers from. To solve this large shadow size problem in secret image sharing, Thien and Lin [20] embed the secret pixels in all coefficients of a (k −1)-degree polynomial and reduce the shadow size to 1 k of the secret image. This variant use of Shamir's (k, n)-SSS is denoted as (k, n)-VSSS in this paper. Since the smaller shadow size makes the transmission and storage more convenient, the (k, n)-VSSS has drawn many attentions in the following studies [2-4, 6, 7, 14, 16, 20-26, 28-32] of TSISS ever since. Initially, Thien and Lin [20] adopt GF (251) as the coefficient field, and the pixel's gray-level degrees has to be modified to less than 251. Therefore, Thien and Lin's scheme is in fact a lossy secret image sharing scheme, in which the reconstructed secret image may be distorted slightly in gray-level. In 2007, Yang et al. [27] adopt GF (2 8 ) as the coefficient field, avoiding the losses in gray-level. Recently, (k, n)-TSISS has been combined with steganography and authentication [3, 4, 6, 28, 31] , which divides a secret image into several shadows and embeds the produced shadows in the cover images to form the stego images, which can be transmitted to authorized recipients without causing suspicion. In addition, these schemes also have some authentication mechanisms to verify the integrity of the stego images, so that the secret image can be reconstructed correctly. (k, n)-TSISS has also been combined with visual cryptography [1, 10-13, 17, 18] , which provides a two-inone (k, n)-TSISS [16, 29] with two decoding options: the first option is stacking shadows to see a vague reconstructed image like visual cryptography; and the second option is to perfectly reconstruct the original gray-level secret image by Lagrange's interpolation.
However, there is no free lunch. The (k, n)-VSSS is no longer information theoretic secure, and to the best of our knowledge, no research has conjectured that the inverting of a k − 1 degree polynomial f (x) from less than or equal to k − 1 shadows is computational infeasible. From this viewpoint, all of the above mentioned studies of (k, n)-TSISS provide neither of the two currently well-known security guarantees: 1, information theoretic security (also known as perfect secrecy), which is based on Shannon's information theory, e.g. the one-time pad, Shamir's secret sharing scheme, visual cryptography; 2, computational security, which is based on computational hardness assumptions, e.g. RSA, AES, DES. Motivated by the above observation, we in fact find the security defect of previous (k, n)-TSISSs for sharing textual images, in which the secret can be perceived from any single shadow. Please refer to Section 3.
To avoid the above security defect, we suggest to add an AES encryption process before the sharing process to form a computational secure (k, n)-TSISS, which is denoted by (k, n)-CSTSISS. Then we prove it is computational secure by giving a construction that transforms any efficient attack of the (k, n)-CSTSISS to an efficient attack of AES. In addition to theoretic analysis, experimental results are given to show feasibility of the proposed scheme. Compared to previous (k, n)-TSISSs, the proposed (k, n)-CSTSISS needs 256n bits more storage space in overall, and more time for the AES encryption and decryption processes. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries of TSISS. In Section 3, we point out the security defect of the previous (k, n)-TSISSs. In Section 4, we propose a computational secure (k, n)-TSISS. The paper is concluded in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we first give some basic knowledge of Shamir's secret sharing and its variant version that is commonly used in studies of TSISS, and then analyze their security properties sequentially.
Suppose the secret we are going to share is in some finite field, e.g. prime fields GF (p) or prime power fields GF (2 n ). For simplicity, we will take GF (p) for example to illustrate the sharing process in the following. This will not cause any limitations, for the underlying principle is the same except that the operations in GF (2 n ) are modular of some irreducible polynomial of degree n, while those of GF (p) are modular of prime number p.
From any k-subset of these S i values, we can reconstruct f (x) by Lagrange's interpolation and compute the secret by S = f (0). However, from any (k − 1)-subset of these S i values, we get no information about S. Detailed analysis can be found in [19] .
In the (k, n)-VSSS, which is widely used in the studies of (k, To analyze the information leakage of the (k, n)-VSSS from less than k shadows, we have to assume a probability distribution on the secret. For the simplicity of analysis and consistency with our proposed scheme, we assume that the secret is uniformly distributed in its space. For some knowledge of information theory, one can refer to [5] . Here we only give some necessary backgrounds. Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. Suppose X is a random variable, its entropy is defined by
1 . The amount of randomness in random variable X given that you know the value of
, which is also known as the conditional entropy of X and Y . Briefly speaking, a (k, n)-SSS is information theoretic secure if any k −1 shadows provide no information about the secret. Formally, this notion is given as follows. As Theorem 2 shows, the (k, n)-VSSS is far from being information theoretic secure. On the other hand, from the computational viewpoint, no research has conjectured that the inverting of a k − 1 degree polynomial f (x) from less than or equal to k−1 shadows is computational infeasible. Hence the (k, n)-VSSS that is widely used in secret image sharing has neither of the two well-known security guarantees, which may cause security risks to the previous studies of TSISS [2-4, 6, 7, 14, 16, 20-26, 28-32] . In the following, we present the common subprogram that all the above studies of (k, n)-TSISS share formally as Construction 1.
Definition 1 (Information theoretic secure). In a (k, n)-SSS, suppose the secret is distributed according to random variable S and the n shadows are distributed according to random variables
S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n . The (k, n)-SSS is informa- tion theoretic secure if H(S) = H(S|S i1 , . . . , S i k−1 ) holds for any k − 1 shadows S i1 , . . . , S i k−1 .
Theorem 1 ([19]). Shamir's (k, n)-SSS is information theoretic secure.

Theorem 2. In the (k, n)-VSSS, there is only
= (D 0 , D 1 , . . . , D k−1 ) is H(D) = p k −1 ∑ i=0 1 p k log p k = log p k = k log p. NowD 0 ∈ GF (p), we have exactly one k −1 degree polynomial f ′ j (x) with f ′ j (0) = D 0 and f ′ j (i t ) = S it for 1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1. As D 0 is randomly drawn from GF (p), the p polynomials f ′ j (x)
Construction 1
Input: A secret image S.
Step Step 2. Participant i is distributed S i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Remark: In Step 1., we use the (k, n)-VSSS, whose security is not guaranteed. This may cause hidden security risk to Construction 1. Indeed we have found its security defect for sharing textual images, please refer to Section 3.
The security defect of Construction 1
In this section, we present some experimental results to illustrate the security defect of Construction 1, while concrete theoretical analysis of the experiment is given in the Appendix.
Here we only give a general idea of the cause of the security defect. Since the sharing process (Step 1.) of Construction 1 is deterministic, the same combination of k secret pixels will always contribute to the same combination of n share values. In such a case, if the secret image is of little variation in gray-level, e.g. textual images, its content might be leaked from a single shadow.
For Construction 1 of (2, 3) threshold access structure, the experimental results on coefficient fields GF (251) and GF (2 8 ) can be found in Figures 1 and   2 respectively, in which any single shadow reveals the content of the secret image. Remark: The above security defect seems to be obvious, so why it is not discovered in previous studies? One of the reasons may be that in previous experiments, they only use Construction 1 to encode natural dithered images and never use Construction 1 to encode textual images. But we think a good secret image sharing scheme should be able to deal with all kinds of images, and shouldn't make any restriction on the content of the image.
The proposed computational secure (k, n)-TSISS
In this section, we first propose a new (k, n)-TSISS. Then we will prove that this (k, n)-TSISS is computational secure.
Definition 2 (Computational secure). Let the secret s be drawn from GF (2 m ).
A (k, n)-SSS is computational secure if for any probability polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A, P r[A(s i1 , . . . , s i k−1 ) = s] is negligible in m, which is the success probability of getting the secret s from any
Remark: In other words, it is computational infeasible to invert the (k, n) secret sharing scheme from any k − 1 shadows s i1 , . . . ,
To achieve computational security, we need to have a computational hardness assumption. For some knowledge of computational security and AES in CBC mode, one can refer to [9, 15] . In this paper, we will use the following assumption:
Assumption 1 It is computational infeasible to invert AES in CBC mode without the key.
The proposed computational secure (k, n)-TSISS, also abbreviated as (k, n)-CSTSISS, contains two parts: Construction 2, which is the sharing program run by the dealer in the encoding phase; Construction 3, which is the revealing program run by the shadow holders in the decoding phase.
Construction 2
Step 1. Pick up a random 128 bit key K and a random 128 bit initialization vector IV .
Step 2. Encrypt the secret image S by AES with key K and initialization vector IV in CBC mode. Each time we encrypt a 128 bit block, which contains 16 pixels for gray level image. The encrypted secret image is denoted as D.
Step Remark: In Step 3., we use the (k, n)-VSSS, whose security is not guaranteed, and in Step 4., we use Shamir's (k, n)-SSS, which is information theoretic secure. The coefficient field that we use in Step 3. is GF (2 8 ).
Construction 3
Input: Any k shadows: 
Step 3. Decrypt D by AES in CBC mode with key K and initialization vector
IV . The output is S.
Theorem 3. If Assumption 1 holds, then the proposed (k, n)-CSTSISS is computational secure.
Proof: Assume we have an attack algorithm Adv that can recover the secret from some k − 1 shadows generated by Construction 2. In other words, we have
In the following, we give a new construction that can recover the plaintext from the ciphertext generated by AES in CBC mode by calling Adv as an oracle.
Construction 4
Input: The ciphertext (C, IV ′ ).
Output:
The plaintext S.
Bytes of C. The pixel value for each shadow is calculated as
Repeat the above process until all Bytes of C have been shared. The shadows are denoted as S
Step 2. Generate k − 1 random key shadows of 128 bits:
Step 3. What we have to show is that Adv cannot distinguish ((S 1 , K 1 , IV ) , . . . ,
, so that if Adv can decrypt the first ciphertext, it can decrypt the second ciphertext too. We first give the following Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 1:
is in uniform distribution, we only need to prove that (K 1 , . . . , K k−1 ) is also in uniform distribution.
(K 1 , . . . , K k ) are generated by the following equations: 
Write the above equations in matrix form:
Observe that the coefficient matrix is of Van der Monde (of full rank). Therefore, it can be taken as a 1-1 mapping from (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 
. This is the end of the proof of Lemma 1.
Since Shamir's (k, n)-SSS is information theoretic secure, the k − 1 shares
are also independent of the AES encryption key of (S
which is unknown. In addition to this, IV and IV ′ are both in uniform distribution and independent from K and K ′ respectively. Hence Adv cannot
In addition, Construction 4 is polynomial computable, which guarantees that if Adv is an efficient attack of the proposed (k, n)-CSTSISS, Construction 4 is also an efficient attack of AES in CBC mode by calling Adv as an oracle. The reason why Theorem 3 holds is that inverting AES in CBC mode without the key is computational infeasible, thus the assumed attack algorithm Adv cannot exist, otherwise we can attack AES in CBC mode efficiently.
Remark: For some knowledge of probabilistic analysis, one can refer to [8] .
Compared to previous (k, n)-TSISSs, the price we have payed out is 2×128×n bits more storage space in overall, and more time for the AES encryption and decryption processes. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the (k, n)-VSSS, being extensively used in the studies of (k, n)-TSISS, does not have security guarantees. Furthermore, we have found those studies' security defect for sharing textual images and then patched up this security defect by adding an AES encryption process before the sharing process, which combines the beauty of small shadow size with computational security guarantee. In the following, we will analyze the shadows generated by Construction 1 on two commonly used coefficient fields: GF (251) and GF (2 8 ). In computers, pure black pixel is represented by gray-level 0 and pure white pixel is represented by gray-level 255. If the t pixels being encoded are all pure black, then we get a zero polynomial f (x) = 0. In such a case, all share values are f (i) = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. In other words, black area on the secret image will promise black on the corresponding area on shadows.
Acknowledgments
In order to make the encoding process feasible for coefficient field GF (251), the pixels of gray-level larger than 250 are all set to gray-level 250. Although this method has some losses in gray-level degree, it is still the most widely used technique in secret image sharing. The reasons may be that this method is very easy to understand and implement, and the losses in visual quality are hardly noticeable. For (2, 3) threshold access structure, the sharing polynomial can be denoted by f (x) = ax + b. Each time, we encode two successive pixels by the coefficients "a, b". If the pixels are "0,0", the sharing polynomial is f (x) = 0 mod 251, which results shares f (1) = 0, f (2) = 0, f (3) = 0. If the pixels are "250,250", the sharing polynomial is f (x) = 250x + 250 mod 251, which results shares f (1) = 249, f (2) = 248, f (3) = 247. If the pixels are "250,0", the sharing polynomial is f (x) = 250x mod 251, which results shares f (1) = 250, f (2) = 249, f (3) = 248. If the pixels are "0,250", the sharing polynomial is f (x) = 250 mod 251, which results shares f (1) = 250, f (2) = 250, f (3) = 250. The above calculation shows that white areas ("250,250") and boundary areas ("250,0", "0,250") are encoded into almost white on each shadow while black areas ("0,0") are encoded into black on each shadow. Hence we conclude that the secret may be perceived from a single shadow for binary textual secret images. Please refer to images in Figure 1 .
The operations in GF (2 8 ) are a little more complicated than those in GF (251).
In the following, we will take some related examples to briefly introduce the operations in GF ( 2 8 
